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AUGUSTINE'S TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FREE WILL DEFENCE
Rowan A. Greer

Augustine's first conversion is to the Christian Platonism of his day, which
brought along with it a free-will defence to the problem of evil. Formative as
this philosophical influence was, however, Augustine's own experience of
sin combines with his sense of God's sovereignty to lead him to modify the
views he inherited in significant ways. This transformation is demonstrated
by setting Augustine's evolving position against that of Gregory of Nyssa.

Truth! Truth! How the very marrow of my soul within me
yearned for it as they [the Manichees]l dinned it in my ears over
and over again! To them it was no more than a name to be
voiced or a word to be read in their libraries of huge books. But
while my hunger was for you, for Truth itself, these were the
dishes on which they served me up the sun and the moon, beautiful works of yours but still only your works, not you yourself
nor even the greatest of your created things ....
Augustine, Confessions 3.6
So Augustine in his mid-forties looks back at the nineteen year old
youth he once was. His reading of Cicero's Hortensius had persuaded
him to abandon the study of the law with its dreams of a career in the
imperial civil service and to become a teacher in order to embark upon
the quest for truth. At least that is the way it looks to him in hindsight,
and from the same perspective he sees that he had followed false paths
until the child's voice heard in the garden at Milan commanded him to
pick up Paul's letters and to read the thirteenth chapter of Romans. The
conversion Augustine describes in Book 8 of the Confessions led to his
resignation of the chair of rhetoric he held, to an extended retreat at
Cassiciacum outside Milan where he wrote the earliest works that survive, and to his baptism in 387.
There can be no doubt that the Christianity Augustine embraced was
the Christian Platonism we find in both Greek and Latin, in Ambrose
and Marius Victorinus as well as in the Cappadocians. We should not, I
think, imagine that Augustine first assents to neo-Platonism and then
becomes Christian. Instead, it is his early conviction that Plato and his
followers, were they to come to life again, would see in the church their
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own message proclaimed persuasively to alP Even the later Augustine
does not abandon this perspective entirely. His lyrical description in
Confessions 7 of what he finds in the "Platonic books" focusses upon the
Platonic - or even the Plotinian - teaching about the soul. "These books"
(almost certainly Marius Victorinus' Latin translations of Plotinus)
"served to remind me to return to my own self." He discovers that God
alone is absolute Being and Truth, while the soul exists and possesses
truth and goodness only by participating in God.
In this way the void resulting from Augustine's rejection of
Manichaean dualism disappears for him. He now sees that evil is not a
substance, co-eternal with good, but instead is the deprivation of good.
In other words, he now sees that the Christian Platonist ideal of contemplation and of the ascent of the soul to God is correlative with what we
may call his version of the free will defence, involving as it does the idea
of evil as the privation of good and so as "non-being."3 To be sure,
Augustine realizes that these Platonic ideas must be Christianized; and
he points out that though the Platonic books conform to the prologue to
John's Gospel, they lack any reference to the Word made flesh.
Nevertheless, he has found a road map for his own life as a Christian. It
remains for him to follow that map, a possibility given him by his conversion in the garden. 4
That Augustine's conversion was to the Christian Platonism of his
day finds clearest confirmation in the simple fact that his early writings
contain no allusion to his later - and idiosyncratic - doctrines of original
sin and prevenient grace. Let me cite some passages from Of True
Religion, probably written in 393 and sent to Paulinus of Nola in 394 as
part of what Paulinus called Augustine's "Pentateuch against the
Manichees." In the treatise Augustine insists upon human freedom and
does so by employing a metaphor he will later transform in terms of his
predestinarian schema. The church is God's threshing floor. "On this
floor everyone voluntarily makes himself either corn or chaff." (OTR
vi.10) There is no question of a depravity inherited from Adam. It is
only the "death of the body" that represents Adam's legacy. (OTR xii.2S,
xv.29) This legacy does not prevent humans from choosing the good.
"[Sjin is so much a voluntary evil that it is not sin at all unless it is voluntary." (OTR xiv.27)i "Por divine providence has so moderated our
punishment that even in this corruptible body it is permitted to us to
work towards righteousness .... " (OTR xv.29) To be sure, we need education and healing; but any Christian Platonist would say the same thing.
The point is that the early Augustine has not yet concluded that we are
born not only mortal but also spiritually dead and condemned to eternal
damnation.
Similarly, the early Augustine contents himself with the usual
Christian Platonist view that God persuades but never coerces. The
Word incarnate "did nothing by violence, but everything by persuasion
and warning." (OTR xvi.31) "His whole life on earth as Man, in the
humanity he deigned to assume, was an education in morals." (OTR
xvi.32) God has dispensed the two testaments like a wise physician, and
we can remember that the ancients understood the doctor's work as a
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persuasive art, necessarily limited by the exigencies of the disease. (OTR
xvii.34) The persuasive character of God's providence expresses itself in
the rewards and punishments that are consequent upon our exercise of
freedom. Thus, neither the tree in paradise nor God's command not to
eat of it were evil. Rather, the transgression of God's command was evil
and so brought upon our first parents God's "just condemnation." That
condemnation, however, carried with it something educative, sc. the
power to distinguish good and evil. "When the soul has become
involved in its sin, it learns, by paying the penalty, the difference
between the precept it refused to obey and the sin which it committed.
In this way it learns by suffering to know the evil it did not learn to
know by avoiding it." (OTR xx.38) Augustine speaks of God's persuasive providence in a way that would be congenial to Origen or Gregory
of Nyssa; he does not speak of God's prevenient or operative grace, a
grace that cannot be resisted. 6
If Augustine's early theology is Christian Platonist in character and
lacks his later doctrines of original sin and operative grace, we must
explain why he elaborates these later ideas. I wish to suggest that it is
Augustine's increasing recognition that the Christian Platonist theology
fails to fit his own experience in crucial ways that leads him towards his
mature theology. Of course, he never repudiates Christian Platonism,
but his novel ideas transform the view with which he begins. One can, I
think, see this happening in his earliest writings. He wrote the Soliloquies at Cassiciacum in 386. In this work he reproduces the common
idea that a period of moral purification will enable the soul to ascend to
God; the soul's "eyes" will see God. But he also betrays his own despair
of healing. There are dark forces within him that he can neither understand nor control, and they act as an obstacle to healing and so call into
question the basic assumptions of the religious view to which he had
committed himself.
If this interpretation is convincing, it follows that the first step
Augustine takes is to explain his spiritual condition as the product of the
Fall. The legacy of Adam involves more than mortality; it renders all
humans incapable of good in any true sense. Moreover, our radical
incapacity necessitates an appeal to God's sovereignty. The basic
Christian Platonist pattern remains - we have been made to participate
in God, and our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Him. (Conf.
1.1) But the restless heart from its birth moves away from God,
deprived of good and full being. Only God's sovereign grace can
reverse that movement of deprivation, and grace will finally become not
only sovereign but also selective. What I am suggesting is that a double
religious perspective explains Augustine's transformation of the
Christian Platonist conventions. His deep sense of human incapacity,
combined with an insistence upon God's sovereignty effects a sea
change upon the theology he inherits. As will be seen, I wish to explain
Augustine's development without appealing to the various polemical
contexts for his writings. It seems to me misleading to suppose that he is
a Pelagian in refuting the Manichees, and a Manichee in refuting to
Pelagians. 7 It is, therefore, with this general assessment of Augustine's
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development in mind that I wish to examine On Free Will. This treatise
seems to me transitional, moving towards the mature view. Perhaps
more important, it enables us to understand how Augustine transforms
the Christian Platonist theodicy.

Gregory of Nyssa's Christian Platonist Theodicy
Before turning to On Free Will, however, let me seek to describe the
view of evil that Gregory of Nyssa elaborates in his Catechetical Oration.
We cannot claim, of course, that Augustine knew this work, even
though he does seem to have read some of the Cappadocians' writings
in Latin translation." Nevertheless, there are several reasons for starting
with Gregory's theodicy. In its main outline it articulates the view we
find everywhere, even in the early Augustine's works. Moreover,
Gregory clearly treats the view as one that should be taught to those
preparing for baptism; the Catechetical Oration purports to outline the
instructions catechists are to give. Thus, we are dealing with a religious
view that Gregory supposes to be the church's teaching for all its members. Finally, and perhaps paradoxically, the theology Gregory elaborates presses the logic of the free will defence in a direction quite the
opposite of the one Augustine will take.
The Catechetical Oration begins with an account of the Trinity and of
creation. God created humanity so that humans could share in God's
goodness. Gregory presupposes that the image of God is the created
likeness that enables us to know God, who is the Good, and to translate
that knowledge into virtue. Towards the end of section 5 he points out
that "our present situation" does not correspond to the ideal picture he
has drawn. Instead, we find that "human life is at present in an unnatural condition." He resolves the problem thus raised by treating a mutable
freedom as the cause of evil (CO 5; LCC 3, pp. 277f.):
The existence of evil did not have its origin in the divine
will. For no blame, indeed, would attach to evil, could it claim
God as its creator and father. But evil in some way arises from
within. It has its origin in free will, when the soul withdraws
from the good. For as sight is an activity of nature and blindness is a privation of natural activity, so virtue is in this way
opposed to vice. Just as darkness follows the removal of light
and disappears in its presence, so, as long as goodness is present
in a nature, evil is something nonexistent.... Since, then, it is the
mark of free will to choose independently what it wants, God is
not the cause of your present woes. For he made your nature
independent and free. The cause is rather your thoughtlessness
in choosing the worse instead of the better.
By "evil" Gregory means the evil we do and not the evil we suffer. By
"free will" (proairesis) he means our capacity to choose, and he thinks of
that capacity as the soul's movement towards good or towards evil. We
do not, I think, have any notion of the will as a human faculty in contrast
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to the intellect. Instead, the will is the activity of the soul or personality
in choosing.
Gregory continues his argument by saying that vice and evil are not,
properly speaking, the opposites of virtue and good. Rather, they are
privations and so have no independent existence. It is in this sense, first
of all, that evil is "non-being." We must add two points. First, to say
that evil is the privation of good and has no independent ontological status need not mean that evil has no reality or that it is purely passive in
character. "If a man in broad daylight of his own free will closes his
eyes, the sun is not responsible for his failure to see." (CO 7) Gregory, in
this way, can treat evil as a rebellion against the good and so leave room
for the Biblical idea of sin as rebellion against God. Second, it is not only
humans who misuse their mutable freedom to deprive themselves of
good, but also Satan and his angels who do so. Gregory complicates the
Platonist view by tying it to the Biblical story. Adam and Eve are, to be
sure, responsible for their disobedience; but the temptation of Satan is an
explanation of the Fall and so supplies a mitigating factor. Despite these
complications we can describe Gregory's view as follows: God is not the
cause of evil; rather, the misuse of a mutable freedom by angels and
humans to turn from God, good, and being towards evil and non-being
is the cause of evil.
The question that obviously presents itself is why angels and humans
should misuse their capacity to choose the good. Gregory has nothing to
say from this point of view about the angels. Unlike Augustine he fails
to worry about why creatures who presumably know the good should
fail to act upon that knowledge. With respect to humanity, however,
Gregory has a persuasive answer. In the passage I have cited above he
speaks of "thoughtlessness." Later in the Catechetical Oration he explains
our choice of evil by using the story of Aesop's dog, who drops the real
bone to seize its reflection in the water. (CO 21) The implication, surely,
is that the choice of evil is really a mistake about the good. No one
deliberately chooses evil (pace the later Augustine and Milton's Satan,
who says "evil be thou my good."). Instead, our immaturity leads us to
choose a specious good instead of the true good. Ignorance correlates
with vice the way knowledge does with virtue. Like the child who has
the capacity to walk but can learn to exercise that capacity only by stumbling, so we have the capacity to choose the good but learn to use it only
by trial and error. In other words, Gregory explains evil by placing it in
a narrative of human development.
One further point can be made. Immediately before his reference to
Aesop's dog Gregory argues that as creatures we are always subject to
change and that change takes two forms. As a movement towards the
good "its progress is continual, since there is no conceivable limit to the
distance it can go." If the Good is infinite, we can progress towards it
forever. On the other hand, Gregory implies that since evil is somehow
bounded by good, our movement towards it is limited. In this way he
lays one foundation for his spiritual ideal of epektasy (perpetual progress in the good) and for his universalism. 9 In the long run everyone,
even Satan, will mature and learn to walk the path that leads to infinite

476

Faith and Philosophy

Good, to God. And, of course, it is God who heals and trains freedom
for this end. We must, then, turn to Gregory's understanding of God's
providence.
If free will explains the origin of evil, we must ask how God responds
to the evil thus introduced into a good creation. Gregory's answer to this
question hinges upon the necessity of admitting that God permits evil.
That is, if God gave the mutable freedom misused by angels and
humans, we are obliged to say that while he does not cause evil, he permits it. The mother who gives the keys of the car to her sixteen year old
boy does not cause the accident; but she does permit it. God's permission of evil, then, represents a voluntary relinquishment of his sovereignty.TO Gregory ties this idea to an Origenist understanding of the relation of providence to freedom. Providence is not antecedent to freedom,
but in the first instance simply supplies the context in which we exercise
freedom. It is a general and universal divine operation, and it is persuasive in character. God's providence like a parent's love does not compel.
The effect of God's providence, however, differs depending upon how
we use it. Rightly used, providence benefits us; wrongly used, it has a
punitive effect. And since the punishment is one we bring upon ourselves, it is justly retributive. But it is also, mysteriously, remedial.
God's punishments are always healing and educative; the same Greek
word means both punishment and education. In the Catechetical Oration
Gregory employs this schema to explain Satan's fate. His punishment is
justly retributive; the deceiver is himself deceived. But it is also remedial; Christ "freed man from evil, and healed the very author of evil himself." (CO 26)
Gregory, I think, sees clearly that his view amounts to a denial that
God remains in sovereign control of evil. To be sure, one could argue
that a self-limitation is not a true limitation; but there can be no question
that God abandons his exercise of sovereignty, and equally no question
that he will regain his full sovereignty only when he has persuaded all to
be voluntarily subject to himself. Gregory, however, takes one further
step. He suggests that, paradoxically, God's apparent loss of sovereignty may in fact be a sign of his true power. The Pauline paradox of power
effected through weakness may lie behind his argument. The incarnation is God's chief remedy for evil. Just as we are not surprised by a
flame that shoots upwards but regard a flame moving downwards as a
marvel, so we are more amazed that God embraced the weakness of our
nature than that he created the universe. (CO 24) Perhaps we can say
that a sovereignty effected by persuasion has more value than one
brought about by coercion.
As we shall see, many of the conventions Gregory employs and all
the conclusions he draws from them pose serious difficulties for
Augustine. At the human level, can we explain our choice of evil as an
immature mistake about the good? Do we never knowingly choose evil?
Will all be saved? At the divine level, can we admit that God abandons
his sovereignty? Is providence merely persuasive? Are God's punishments always remedial? These questions lead Augustine to transform
and so to obscure the view that Gregory elaborates. Gregory's theory, as
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a theory, is fairly impressive. To put it in terms of the way people have
usually posed the question of theodicy since the time of Epicurus,ll in
the short run Gregory insists upon God's goodness and the existence of
evil, but denies God's omnipotence. In the long run, however, he insists
upon God's goodness and omnipotence, but denies that there will be
any evil. Evil is non-being not merely because it has no independent
existence, but also because it has no final existence. Gregory's solution
depends upon placing his theodicy in the context of a narrative. We can
make the same judgement with respect to Augustine. But the stories,
though both Christian, are quite different.

Augustine's On Free Will
In his Retractions (I.ix) Augustine describes his treatise as follows:
While we were still delayed at Rome we determined to discuss
the question of the origin of evil. The principle on which the
discussion was to proceed was this. We were to try if possible
to let rational argument, so far as we could with God's help in
our discussion, demonstrate to our intellects what we already
believed about the matter on divine authority. After careful reasoning we agreed that evil has no other origin than in the free
choice of the will.
It seems to me that we can take this description seriously. The treatise
itself begins with Evodius' question: "Tell me, pray whether God be not
the author of evil." In other words, the treatise is primarily an attempt
to think through and to raise questions about the Christian Platonist free
will defence and only secondarily a polemical response to Manichaeism.
It seems unlikely that it is one of the anti-Manichaean treatises known to
PauIinus of Nola in 394, since Augustine sends it to PauIinus a year or
more later. (Epist. 31) Moreover, even though Augustine in his
Retractions goes on to tell us that he began the treatise in 387/388 while
still in Rome but completed Books II and III in Africa after his ordination
to the priesthood in 391 (possibly as late as 395 or 396), nevertheless he
gives no indication that his view changes during the writing of the treatise.
For these reasons I wish to argue for two basic presuppositions. First,
we cannot explain tensions and apparent contradictions in the work by
appealing to a change in Augustine'S views during the writing of the
treatise. Second, we should not be misled by some of his other remarks
in the Retractions so as to treat the work as primarily a treatise against
the Manichees. To be sure, Augustine is embarrassed by the use of the
treatise by the Pelagians to show that Augustine was "pleading their
cause." He rebuts this claim by denying his views changed and by
claiming that "even in these books On Free Will which were written not
at all against them, for they did not yet exist, but against the Manichees,
I have not been completely silent about the grace of God, which in their
horrible impiety they are endeavouring to abolish." This retrospective
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judgement says more about the later place of the treatise in the Pelagian
controversy than about its original purpose. And, I think, while
Augustine is correct that its argument does not support the Pelagians, he
is disingenuous to suggest that its point of view can be identified with
his mature view. In sum, we need to examine On Free Will as an exploration of the Christian Platonist free will defence, designed to uncover
its weaknesses by pressing its logic.
The structure of the argument demonstrates that Augustine is willing,
at one level, to accept the free will defence. Book I carefully shows that
evil in the true sense is the evil we do rather than the evil we suffer and
that it is the product of voluntary wrong-doing. In other words, God
does not cause evil; rather the misuse of a mutable freedom is the cause
of evil. Augustine elaborates this view by defining voluntary wrongdoing as a violation of the eternal law stamped upon our minds, a violation that prevents the mind from fulfilling its task as the governing principle of the body and the bodily passions. This positive exposition, however, yields a problem which Augustine addresses in I.xii.24ff. and to
which he returns in I1I.xvii.47. What I wish to suggest is that Augustine
accepts the usual explanation but believes that it fails to explain why
humans (and angels) would misuse God's gift of free will.
Augustine is more concerned to demonstrate that God is not the
cause of evil, even indirectly by giving free will. The argument of Book
II insists that God exists (iii.7-xv.39), that all good things are from God
(xv.40-xvii.46), and that free will "is to be numbered among the things
which are good." (xviii.47-xx.54) In one sense, the argument boils down
to the assertion that God's gift of free will was designed to enable us to
cleave to "the unchangeable good" and so find happiness and that the
misuse of the gift does not affect its goodness. At the same time,
Augustine also implies that the misuse of freedom in no way compromises God's sovereignty, a point he argues in lII.v.12-xvi.46. Once again
Augustine accepts the free will defence as a way of denying that God is
the cause of evil, but he carefully avoids speaking of God's permission
of evil. A second problem, then, emerges. Granted that evil originates
in the misuse of God's gift of freedom, can we maintain that God
remains sovereign once evil has entered his creation? It begins to look
as though faith cannot find full understanding. The argument has
become so "circuitous" that it is not fully convincing. 12
Let me turn to the first of the problems that Augustine's argument
raises. Why do humans misuse their freedom?!3 In Book I Augustine
repeatedly emphasizes the capacity of free will for good. The "ruling
mind" cannot be compelled to desert virtue by what is superior, since
what is superior must also be just. Nor can it be subverted by anything
inferior to it, since what is inferior must be weak. "So our argument
teaches us: Nothing makes the mind a companion of cupidity, except its
own will and free choice." (I.xi.21) Nothing is so completely "within
the power of the will" as the will itself; and one may, therefore, have a
good will "by willing it simply." (I.xii.26) By pressing the logic of the
Christian Platonist understanding of free will Augustine arrives at the
following conclusion (l.xiii.29):
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Hence it follows that whoever wishes to live rightly and honourably, if he prefers that before all fugitive and transient goods,
attains his object with perfect ease. In order to attain it he has to
do nothing but to will it.
This conclusion means that happiness is within our easy grasp, and
Evodius says he "can hardly refrain from shouting for joy, when I find I
can so quickly and so easily obtain so great a good."
But Evodius has been trapped, and his joyful shout is premature.
Augustine's argument, I think, is made of straw. Though consistent and
logical, it shatters against the realities of our world. If we can find happiness so easily, "[w]hy, then, do not all obtain it?" Clearly all people
wish to be happy, but equally clearly most are unhappy. Why?
Augustine answers the question as follows (Lxiv.30):
So when we say that men are unhappy voluntarily, we do not
mean that they want to be unhappy, but that their wills are in
such a state [in ea valuntate sunt] that unhappiness must follow
even against their will.
What does he mean? My suggestion is that Augustine here intro-duces
a novel distinction between "free will" (liberum arbitrium) and the "will"
(valuntas). He repeatedly uses the expression "the free choice of the
will," and in this way treats the relation of the two terms as correlative
with motive and act. That is, "will" is a way of speaking of what motivates our "free choices."J4
We can argue, further, that by "will" Augustine does not mean a distinct human faculty as though we could oppose the will to the intellect.
On the contrary, he simply elaborates the Christian Platonist understanding of free will by distinguishing choice from the fundamental posture or orientation of the mind that motivates choicesY Thus, we remain
able to choose happiness; but this choice is blocked and undermined by
our condition and our fundamental orientation. The evil or perverse
will (II. xiv.37) is, then, a way of speaki,ng of our "penal state" of ignorance and difficulty. We are unable to know the good and incapable
of doing it. (IILxviii.51-52) This is our inheritance from Adam and
explains why "man [sic] cannot rise of his own free will as he fell by his
own will spontaneously." What remains is to "hold with steadfast faith
the right hand of God stretched out to us above, even our Lord Jesus
Christ." (ILxx.54)
Even though Augustine articulates his view in somewhat different
terms from those we find later in the City of God, the Enchiridian, and the
anti-Pelagian writings, there can be little doubt that his problem with the
free will defence has led him to a doctrine of original sin. We inherit
from Adam not only mortality but also an incapacity for the good which
vitiates even our choices of happiness. The Christian Platonist idea that
we have the capacity of choosing good or evil now attaches only to
Adam and Eve before the fal1. 16 An obvious problem follows (III. xix. 53):
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If Adam and Eve sinned, what have we miserable creatures
done to deserve to be born in the darkness of ignorance and in
the toils of difficulty, that, in the first place, we should err not
knowing what we ought to do, and, in the second place, that
when the precepts of justice begin to be opened out to us, we
should wish to obey them but by some necessity of carnal lust
should not have the power?

Augustine replies to this objection by appealing to those who have been
"victorious over error and lust" by seeking God's help. Though we are
radically incapacitated by the fall, the one capacity we retain is the ability "to turn to God, and so overcome the punishment which had been
merited by the original turning away from God .... " (III.xix.53-xx.55)
If Augustine's first problem with the free will.defence (why do we
misuse a mutable freedom?) leads him to a doctrine of original sin, the
second problem (how can we square God's sovereignty with the existence of evil?) does not at first seem to produce so radical a step. The
implication of the passage to which I have just referred is that God's
help and grace are available to all who seek it. We do not yet have
Augustine's later view of prevenient or sovereign grace. Here we can
summon grace; later it will be only grace that can summon us. At the
same time, we do find in On Free Will the insistence upon God's sovereignty that contains the seeds of the later view. The first part of Book III
reflects Augustine's preoccupation with this theme. He begins by arguing that God's foreknowledge of sin cannot be equated with his foreordination of sin. We do not determine what we remember. Similarly,
God does not determine what he foresees. (III.ii.4ff.; III.iv.9-11) God, of
course, is eternal; and so "He determined once for all how the order of
the universe he created was to go on, and he never changes his mind."
(III.iii.6) Evodius may not be putting the point as clearly as he might,
but Augustine would accept the idea that God orders the universe in a
sovereign way. At the same time, we can distinguish two forms of
ordering (III.v.17):
Reason judges by the light of truth, and correctly subordinates
lesser things to those that are greater. Utility, guided by experience of convenience, often attributes a higher value to things
which reason convinces us are of lesser rank.
While he does not make the correlation clear. Augustine appears to have
this sort of distinction in mind when he speaks of God's ordering of the
moral universe. "All must be contemplated in the light of the perfection
of the universe." This implies that had there been no sin God would
have ordered the universe according to reason, placing each being in its
proper place in the whole. But the universe "is no less perfect because
there is misery for sinners." Again by implication, the order of utility
integrates sin into the total picture. "Hence the penal state is imposed to
bring it into order, and is therefore in itself not dishonourable. Indeed it
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compels the dishonourable state to become harmonized with the honour
of the universe, so that the penalty of sin corrects the dishonour of sin."
(III.ix.25-26)
Augustine leaves open the possibility that evil might not have entered
creation. But his concern is to argue that its entrance in no way compromises God's sovereignty. God "did not make them [all natures] in order
that they might sin, but that whether they willed to sin or not to sin they
might be ornaments of the universe." (IIl.xi.32) Moreover, there "is no
interval of time between failure to do what ought to be done and suffering what ought to be suffered, lest for a single moment the beauty of the
universe should be defiled by having the un comeliness of sin without
the comeliness of penalty." (III.xv.44) Only small steps are necessary to
take these ideas to the conclusions that Augustine will later draw. God's
ordering of the universe involves the ordering of good and evil together
to make up a total good. This means that evil is no longer non-being but
is instead the antithesis of good. 17 And it explains how God, at least in
the first instance brings good out of evil; he does so by punishing evil
and so making it subject to his sovereign ordering of the universe.
These ideas, however, are more implicit than explicit in On Free Will.
Conclusion

Let me begin by seeking to summarize my argument. In On Free Will
Augustine accepts the Christian Platonist free will defence as the faith he
seeks to understand. By pressing its logic he finds two problems that do
not lead him to abandon the view but that do require him to modify it.
The first of these problems is why we misuse our freedom. His attempt
to solve this difficulty leads him to a distinction between free choice and
the will, as the basic orientation of the mind, and to a doctrine of original
sin, sc. that we inherit from Adam not only mortality but an incapacity
for the good. The second of these problem is how to reconcile the existence of evil with God's sovereignty. His solution does not deny the
availability of divine assistance and grace, since the one capacity we
retain after the fall is the ability to seek God's help. But he does argue
that God remains sovereign even after the introduction of evil into the
universe, because God by punishing evil orders it together with its
antithesis good to make up a total good. The solutions Augustine offers
do not, I think, reject the free will defence. But they do restrict it to
Adam and Eve before the fall, and they have the effect of giving a sea
change to the usual Christian Platonist view.
Within a year or two of On Free Will Augustine adopts his mature
view of operative or sovereign grace, thus completing his mature theodicy. That view is really intelligible only when placed in a narrative context. I should describe it as follows. God created Adam and Eve
"upright," capable of knowing the good and so exercising their mutable
freedom so as to do the good. They had the possibility of not sinning,
and by saying this Augustine means that they were created so that they
could easily actualize the possibility. We cannot explain why they failed
to do so any more than we can explain why the evil angels, created to
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know the good, fell and failed to do the good. Indeed, Augustine sees
the horror of the fall as tied to its meaninglessness and to the fact we
cannot explain it. We cannot explain why Adam, knowing the good,
would fail to do it; nor can we find any efficient cause of the evil will
that motivated his disobedience. Evil, then, though the product of angelic and human misuse of created freedom, is in the final analysis inexplicable. But its consequence for us, who inherit Adam's penalty, is catastrophic. We are born mortal, spiritually dead and so incapable of good,
and doomed to eternal death. We might suppose that God has in this
way lost control of his universe. Not so. God orders evil together with
good, integrating evil into the total good of the universe. And he does
this by punishing evil, thereby subjecting it to his sovereignty and bringing good out of evil. Nevertheless, quite gratuitously God demonstrates
his mercy by selecting some humans out of the mass of perdition for
redemption. His prevenient grace frees their wills from bondage to sin
and so enables them to begin to turn towards the good. Grace, therefore, is selective and sovereign. The elect remain convalescent in this
life, but in the age to come they find their place with the blessed angels
in the City of God where they will have the impossibility of sinning.
The final picture is one of the two cities ordered together by God to
make up a total good.
What are we to make of this picture? The free will defence has not
disappeared, but Augustine has restricted it to an explanation of the origin of evil. And the story he has elaborated raises, I think, theoretical
difficulties impossible to resolve. It is difficult to avoid concluding that
human freedom has disappeared. To be sure, Augustine can argue that
we retain the capacity to choose even though that capacity is now
restricted to the choice of evil. But this scarcely seems convincing. If we
have no capacity for the good, surely we can give no satisfactory account
of the moral universe. Vice and virtue, reward and punishment become
meaningless terms; and all the stock arguments used by the church
fathers to defend free will come into play. Still more difficult, do we not
have two contradictory theories of evil? From the point of view of its
origin evil is the privation of good and has no ontological status. But in
terms of God's dealings with evil, it is something, sc. the antithesis of
good. The privation/non-being theory implies that evil need not exist.
The antithesis/ ordering theory implies the necessity of evil in a
chiaroscuro vision of the universe. Finally, what sort of God emerges?
If God's permission of evil is forced into an equation not with his good
relinquishment of sovereignty but with his sovereign bringing of good
out of evil by punishing it, then it is hard to see that God is good as well
as omnipotent.
In sum, it seems to me that the story Augustine tells ends by obscuring the free will defence and by introducing logical and philosophical
absurdities into his theodicy. At the same time, this is not what I wish to
conclude. In my view, it is a mistake to treat Augustine as a philosopher. He surely is aware of the difficulties I have listed. His concern, I
should argue, is not to construct a persuasive theory, but to find a way
of articulating his deepest religious convictions. He finds in himself an
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incapacity for good that leads him to suppose he cannot in any way help
himself. But the miracle is that God has helped him, broken his chains,
given him the medicine that will work for his cure in the age to come.
Augustine's theology, as I think, is designed to explain this experience.
Looked at as a set of theories his theology is unpersuasive and repellant.
Treated as a way of arguing that though we cannot help ourselves God
in Christ has helped us, his theology takes on a persuasive character
despite the theoretical and philosophical problems it raises.

Yale Divinity School
NOTES
1. The Manichees were dualists, believed in a first principle of evil, and
identified matter and the body with evil. In the west they tended to appear
as a dualistic form of Christianity. See the discussion in Peter Brown,
Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1967), pp. 46H.
2. See Of True Religion iv. 6-7 (LCC 6, p. 229): "If Plato and the rest of
them, in whose names men glory, were to come to life again and find the
churches full and the temples empty, and that the human race was being
called away from desire for temporal and transient goods to spiritual and
intelligible goods and to the hope of eternal life, and was actually giving its
attention to these things, they would perhaps say ... That is what we did not
dare to preach to the people .... So if these men could live their lives again
today ... they would become Christians, as many Platonists of recent times
have done."
3. I should perhaps add that the Christian Platonist version of the free
will defence depends upon arguing that God alone is absolute good. Thus,
the good for creatures depends upon participation in God; evil is the privation of this participation.
4. I am, of course, thinking of Confessions 7.21: "It is one thing to descry
the land of peace from a wooded hilltop and, unable to find the way to it,
struggle on through trackless wastes where traitors and runaways, captained by their prince, who is lion and serpent in one, lie in wait to attack. It is
another thing to follow the high road to that land of peace, the way that is
defended by the care of the heavenly Commander."
5. In his Retractions Augustine tries to get round the obvious meaning
of this passage. (See LCC 6, p. 219) His attempt to argue that his opinions
have not changed seems scarcely persuasive.
6. Augustine's later view is that because of original sin humans can no
longer will the good. Only God's grace can free them from their bondage to
sin. Thus, grace is a sovereign act of God that comes before (is prevenient of)
any human movement towards good. More generally, Augustine sees grace
as sovereign throughout the Christian life. Hence, the term "operative
grace" can refer to God's grace both before and after election has taken
place, that is, to the grace of perseverance as well as to prevenient grace. The
main point is that the later Augustine, at least by implication, understands
grace as coercive rather than persuasive.
7. The Pelagians insisted that we must make the first move towards
God, after which He comes to our assistance. This view can be taken so far
as to suggest that God's grace is restricted to the law which, in principle,
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humans can obey. Thus, it is easy to associate an insistence upon free will
with Pelagianism and to equate the Manichaean view with a denial of freedom. An insistence upon freedom refutes Manichaean dualism, while refuting the Pelagians might seem to require a denial of freedom. The Pelagians
used Augustine's On Free Will to refute his later view. Augustine's response
in his Retractions is to deny that his view has changed and to say that the
apparent contradiction may be explained by the anti-Manichaean purpose of
On Free Will. Thus, Augustine is himself partly responsible for attempts to
explain his thought primarily by reference to its polemical contexts.
8. See Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (London: Burns & Oates,
1970), pp. 116, 149f., 294-96.
9. By universalism I mean two things. First, Gregory is clear in stating
his conviction that evil has no final existence. See, e.g. On Making of Man 21.2
(NPNF 2.5, p. 411): " ... as evil does not extend to infinity, but is comprehended by necessary limits, it would appear that good once more follows in
succession upon the limit of evil.. .. " Gregory continues by employing the
analogy of an eclipse, arguing that the conical shadow caused by the eclipse
is bounded by light on all sides. Second, universalism means that all, even
Satan, will be saved. Punishments after death will be remedial. See
Catechetical Oration 26 (LCC 3, p. 204): "In this present life patients whose
cure involves surgery and cautery grow incensed at their physicians when
they smart under the pain of the incision. But if by these means they are
restored to health and the pain of the cautery passes off, they will be grateful
to those who effected their cure. It is the same with the evil which is now
mingled with our nature and has become a part of it. When, over long periods of time, it has been removed and those now lying in sin have been
restored to their original state, all creation will join in united thanksgiving,
both those whose purification has involved punishment and those who
never needed purification at all." Cf. CO 35.
10. See Catechetical Oration 15: "Why, then, if he [Godlloved man, did he
not wrest him from the opposing power and restore him to his original state
by some sovereign and divine act of authority [di' authentikes finos kai theikes
exousiasl. ... ? See also Catechetical Oration 24: " ... that the omnipotent nature
[pantodynamon physinl was capable of descending to man's lowly position is
a clearer evidence of power [dynameosl than great and supernatural miracles." Gregory does not deny that God's nature is almighty [pantodynamon],
but he argues that this omnipotence at the level of redemption expresses
itself in persuasive rather than coercive ways, in weakness rather than in
strength.
11. As cited by Lactantius in De Ira Dei 13 (ANF 7, p. 271): "God, he
[Epicurusl says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is
able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able; or He is both willing
and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble ... if He is able and
unwilling, He is envious ... if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble ... if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to
God, from what source then are evils? Or why does He not remove them?"
12. For the theme of "faith seeking understanding" see I.ii.4, l.xi.23, II.i.1,
lLii.5, II.xv.39. The "circuitous" (in tanfos circuitus disputationis) character of
the guest appears at II.xviii.47. Cf. De trinitate 15.28 where Augustine'S conclusion to the treatise would appear to be that faith in the Trinity cannot find
sufficient understanding, at least in this life.
13. Augustine does not here treat the fall of the angels. Cf. City of God
11.11, 12.6, 12.9 where he cannot explain why the evil angels fell. Were the
angels created unequal? Did some receive more grace than the others?
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14. This interpretation depends partly upon resisting the temptation to
understand voluntas as a faculty (the will) distinguishable from the intellect.
It seems to me important to remember that voluntas can mean "wish" or
"desire." On Free Willl.xii.25 demonstrates that Augustine thinks of voluntas
as an attitude, the desire of the mind: "Ev.- What is a good will? Aug.- A
will to live rightly and honorably and to reach the highest wisdom. Just see
whether you do not desire (adpetas) to live a right and honourable life,
whether you do not eagerly desire to be wise (esse sapiens velis), or whether
at least you would venture to deny that when we wish (volumus) such things
we have a good will." On Free Will I.xiii.27 associates the "good will" with
the cardinal virtues, which are adfectiones a11imae. Thus, the "will" is equated
with the mind's desire and the good will with the virtues. 011 Free Will Il.i.3
suggests that this desire motivates our actions: si enim homo aliquod b011um est

et non posset, 11isi cum vellet, recte facere, debuit habere liberam voluntatem, sine
qua recte facere 110n posset. See also II.ii.4: Sic nemo possct per voluntatem peccare,
si voluntas data est ad recte faciendum.
15. Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Volume Two: Willing (New
York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), pp. 87 and 93f., where
she argues that Augustine contrasts will and performance. She regards
Augustine as "the first philosopher of the will" and begins her discussion by
describing the way Augustine sees the will as divided against itself. She distinguishes Augustine's idea from Aristotle's doctrine of "deliberation" by
arguing that Augustine's will is concerned with ends, whereas Aristotle is
speaking of means. (p. 96) Let me cite portions of two of her summations. P.
95: "First: the split within the Will is a conflict, and not a dialogue, and it is
independent of the content that is willed. A bad will is no less split than a
good one and vice versa. Second: the will as commander of the body is no
more than an executive organ of the mind and as such quite unproblematic .... " P. 104: 'To summarize: this Will of Augustine'S, which is not understood as a separate faculty but in its function within the mind as a whole,
where all single faculties-memory, intellect, and will-are "mutually
referred to each other," finds its redemption in being transformed into
Love.' If Augustine distinguishes liberum arbitrium from voluntas, he also distinguishes both from libertas. Freedom refers to the healed will and to the
overcoming of its division by cleaving to God. See On Free Will ILxii.37:
"Herein is our liberty, when we are subject to truth. And Truth is our God
who liberates us from death, that is, from the condition of sin."
16. Note II.xx.54 where he says he does not know the cause of Adam's
choice--cf. the end of the Book III where we have immaturity as a possible
explanation, but one he does not use in the earlier argument.
17. It might be possible to reconcile evil as the privation of good with evil
as the contrary of good. Indeed, this would be one way to read Plotinus,
Ennead 1.8. Here Plotinus accepts the idea that evil is privation and nonbeing-but not non-being in an absolute sense (1.8.3: outi to pantelos me on).
But he wishes to get round the Aristotelian arguments that privation can
only exist in a subject and so cannot have independent existence, and that
existing things need not have contraries. He does so by arguing that evil as
the total privation of good is the last limit of the procession of reality from
the One. (1.8.7) Thus, evil, while not the equal opposite of good, is its contrary, since it is located at the lowest point in the great chain of being.
Plotinus' discussion refers to Theaetetus 176a, where Socrates says: "Evils,
Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the good must always have its
contrary; nor have they any place in the divine world; but they must needs
haunt this region of our mortal nature." Plotinus' argument remains in many
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respects puzzling. See J.M. Rist's discussion "The Descent of the Soul" in
Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967),
pp. 112ff. It seems to me doubtful that Plotinus is the major source of
Augustine's notion of evil as the antithesis of good. E. TeSelle's observations
about the theme of "order" in Augustine are helpful. See op. cit. p. 118: 'When
Augustine uses the term ordo it soon loses the Ciceronian and Plotinian
meanings it had in the early dialogues and comes to be employed almost
exclusively in a rather different sense, probably conveyed through Varro ....
Order in this sense consists, then, in the "coordination" of component parts
or the "right ordering" of one's own attention and affection.' See also his discussion of Augustine'S understanding of providence (pp. 219ff.), where
God's extrinsic governance includes the "Permission and overruling evil."

